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hen conducting war in the modern age, it is in-
cumbent on the belligerent powers to follow es-
tablished rules of conduct as enumerated in just 
war theory and its offspring, international hu-
manitarian law. However, these doctrines have come under at-
tack by, or are woefully inadequate in the face of, modern para-
digms in warfare, specifically the US government’s drone-
mediated targeted killing program.  
 Before explaining the implications of targeted killings to just 
war theory, it is necessary to clarify what drones, or unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs), and targeted killings are. A drone or 
UAV is defined by the Department of Defense as a “powered 
aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator…[and] can 
fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or 
recoverable, and can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload.”1 In 
recent years, they have increasingly been used for targeted kill-
ings, defined as “extra-judicial, premeditated killings by a state 
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of specifically identified persons not in its custody.”2 The US 
military, the CIA, or both may carry out strikes, but the available 
evidence mainly implicates the CIA. Targeted killings are differ-
ent from drone warfare, which is simply conventional war oper-
ations that happen to use drones.3 This paper will focus solely on 
targeted killings, and will use the terms “targeted killing” and 
“drone strike” interchangeably.  
 Just war theory is composed of two sets of principles, jus ad 
bellum governing what war is and reasons to wage it, and jus in 
bello concerning proper conduct during war. Thomas Aquinas 
and later theologians codified the standards for jus ad bellum by 
establishing six conditions for the just prosecution of war: the 
legitimate sovereign power must decide on war; war must be 
waged justly; the legitimate sovereign must have the correct in-
tentions for waging war; any loss of life must be proportional to, 
or exceed the injustice prevented by that loss; a peaceful solution 
must be tried first and found wanting, before waging war; and a 
just war must have a “reasonable hope of success.”4 Only the 
principle of legitimacy, which governs who is and is not a legiti-
mate sovereign power, will be treated in depth in this paper. 
 Jus in bello principles come into effect when war has already 
been declared, and act to constrain the power of a sovereign to 
conduct wanton violence. It is defined by three principles: non-
combatant immunity, stipulating that civilians may not be the 
direct objects of attack and belligerents must discriminate be-
tween civilians and combatants; proportionality, mandating that 
all military objectives must be achieved without excessive force 
or damage to civilians and property; and right intention towards 
peace with justice being maintained at all times, even in the heat 
of war.5 Only the principles of discrimination and proportionali-
ty will be dealt with here. 
 Throughout this paper I will argue from a Kantian perspec-
tive, showing that these principles are dependent on recognizing 
human beings as ends in themselves, which entails that we must 
always treat humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, never 
solely as a means but always simultaneously as an end.6 Indeed, 
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by continuing with the utilitarian calculus that underlies most of 
the practical jus in bello rules of just war theory, we fail to proper-
ly account for human moral worth. By humanity is meant the 
faculty of reason, which endows us with the “power to set 
ends,”7– the “ability to foresee future consequences, adopt long 
range goals, resist immediate temptation, and even to commit 
oneself to ends for which one has no sensuous desire,”8. If hu-
manity is the ultimate end in itself, and this end is based in rea-
son, then all other ends are contingent on reason and subordi-
nate to it. This basic trait inheres in people regardless of their use 
of it, and mandates that they be treated with respect. 
 When humanity is considered as an end, it has the following 
characteristics: it is objective because it implies certain principles 
which any rational beings should accept, namely a respect for 
the humanity that inheres in all people and is valuable beyond 
mere material worth. It is independent of all contingent reasons, 
and instead creates reasons for action and supervenes upon less-
er contingent reasons. It is a moral "ground for self-
determination," a locus of action where moral actors must choose 
to do or not do certain things. It is an end that we may not mo-
lest, but that we must actively promote. When we do use human 
beings as means, we must also simultaneously be able to treat 
them as ends in themselves, by respecting their rational ability to 
set their own, contingent ends.9 In the context of just war theory, 
we treat people as merely means “whenever we use violence 
against them to achieve our purposes.”10 
If we accept these premises, the interlocking principles of au-
tonomy and dignity naturally follow. Autonomy asserts that, if 
humans are ends in themselves because they are rational and 
able to set their own ends, then this rationality forms the corner-
stone of moral value, the “value to which everything else [is] 
subordinated.”11 Further, because autonomy is the highest moral 
value, and all other values are contingent upon the exercise of 
this autonomy, autonomy is incomparable with all other contin-
gent values. This is the concept of dignity, that the autonomy of 
one human being can never justifiably be bartered in exchange for 
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something else of greater or lesser value, because this is an eval-
uation of mere price.12 Human beings are absolutely priceless 
and beyond any mere appraisal of their value. In the context of 
just war theory, this endows them with a palladium against be-
ing harmed unjustly, whether they are civilians or combatants. 
They cannot be reduced to discrete quanta of value, commensu-
rate with other things of value or price, because this would vio-
late their autonomy by attempting to place it within the purview 
of a value-laden calculus – yet their autonomy is axiomatic, in-
herent to their worth as people, and incommensurate with any 
value conditioned by this rationality. 
 Having defined human beings as ends in themselves, and 
having established criteria for how to treat them, it is now my 
responsibility to attempt to justify the use of force in war. We 
need to make a crucial distinction here between combatants and 
civilians. A combatant is defined as someone who engages di-
rectly in attempting to harm, and the use of force is justified 
against him. A civilian is defined as someone who is neither di-
rectly nor indirectly engaged in harm, and so the use of force 
against him is not justified. This distinction is important for all of 
just war theory, but especially in jus in bello, where discriminat-
ing between civilian and combatant is the basis for justifying the 
use of force.  
We must also make a distinction between defending norma-
tive maxims on one hand, and descriptive states of being on the 
other. Justifying the use of force cannot be based on whether hu-
man life is at stake or not, for human life is a descriptive value 
and has no moral content as such – it falls to normative principles 
to define the moral value of life and then to prescribe proper ac-
tion in relation to it. To ignore this distinction is to open the door 
to rather morbid possibilities, for to defend one life or many 
lives, if life is the highest value, may entail the destruction of 
others in a moral calculus that is inimical to the idea of autono-
my. For example, if I am being shot at and my life is at stake, I 
would be justified in using someone else as a human shield to 
save myself. This is obviously unacceptable in a rigorous system 
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of morality. Rather, force is justified on the basis of whether the 
normative principle of autonomy, the idea that human beings 
have inherent worth, is violated or not. When the aggressor acts, 
he acts to universalize a maxim that devalues my autonomy. He 
thus adopts a moral maxim – that my autonomy and life is 
worthless and he has the right to end it – that I cannot accept. I 
cannot respond in kind by devaluing his autonomy, but I can 
respond by defending the sanctity of my own autonomy.13 By 
respecting myself, I am also required to respect my aggressor as 
well, and my use of force is constrained when it more closely re-
sembles “a violation of principles generated by autonomy than a 
respect for a value, when we deliberately threaten the capacity to 
will of those who are not deliberately or directly harming us.”14  
I will now argue that just war theory faces two main chal-
lenges to its legitimacy in this regard. The first problem is that 
modern warfare cannot be adequately captured in the theoretical 
framework of just war theory, and because the theory is unable 
to describe and label the actions that take place, it is concomi-
tantly unable to regulate them. The second is that autonomy, 
which grounds these principles, is ignored specifically because of 
the new paradigms in warfare exemplified by the US targeted 
killing program. 
 
States of War and Jus ad bellum 
 
 These considerations aside, the first question to ask in rela-
tion to targeted killing and just war theory is: can an entire war 
be considered just? In 2010, Harold Koh, a legal advisor for the 
Obama administration, outlined his executive’s justification for 
drone strikes in a keynote address given at the American Society 
of International Law. Koh argued that the administration’s for-
eign policy is based on what he calls the “law of 9/11,” the legal 
and practical considerations that have surfaced in response to 
the terror attacks on September 11, 2001: detention operations, 
targeted killings, and the legal treatment of suspected terrorists. 
Koh characterized these operations as acts of war, arguing that 
the legal basis for the law of 9/11 is to be found in the inherent 
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right of self-defense of a victim nation from an aggressor.15 By 
virtue of being in an “armed conflict” with al-Qaeda and the Tal-
iban – defined by the International Law Association Committee 
as a conflict with the “existence of organized armed groups…
engaged in fighting of some intensity,”16 – the US government is 
justified in the use of force that it argues is “conducted consist-
ently with just war principles.”17 
 The term “armed conflict” is notable here, for international 
humanitarian law defines three different legal frameworks for 
various types of armed conflict: international armed conflict be-
tween sovereign states; non-international armed conflict con-
ducted between a sovereign state and a group (usually within its 
own territory); and the more nebulous, and largely experi-
mental, category of the internationalized non-international armed 
conflict, which entails one or more sovereign states waging war 
on groups, which operate in multiple countries and may or may 
not have the support of those countries, and which requires legal 
frameworks derived from the first two categories.18 Traditional 
just war theory only considers the first category to be just war-
fare, a seemingly arbitrary distinction that certainly requires re-
vision, as I will show. 
 It should be clear that war with al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
couldn’t be considered under the rubric of international armed 
conflict between sovereign states. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are 
certainly armed groups, possessing military command structures 
which facilitate “operations that are proper within the scope of 
war,” the ability to initiate or cease hostilities at will, and the 
ability to defer to diplomats upon the cessation of hostilities.19 
However, they lack other necessary components of a legitimate 
military power. They do not observe conventions of war, they 
engage in acts of terrorism on illegitimate targets in order to fur-
ther their political goals, and their conflict is neither fought fairly 
in terms of legal restrictions, nor humanely with respect to hu-
man lives.20 
More importantly, they cannot be considered as 
“representative of a viable political grouping of people.”21 
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Properly, a legitimate power has de jure authority, justified by a 
legal or moral sanction from the people it purports to govern. 
This is a natural outgrowth of a “common life” shared by this 
people, characterized by individual membership within a larger 
group, each member’s contention that the group is worthwhile to 
be in, and the members’ shared view of the state as the protector 
of this common life.22 The state, as representative of this common 
life, has rights to territorial integrity and political sovereignty, 
which are either violated when a nation is attacked, or forfeited 
partially or wholly when that nation acts as an aggressor against 
another. Whether rights are violated or not is therefore depend-
ent on who possesses these rights – and whether they do so legit-
imately. Only a state that has a rightful sanction from the people, 
in whatever form that may take, can be considered as a legiti-
mate state.23 
 Under these criteria, just war principles are incapable of le-
gitimating the armed conflict between al Qaeda and its affiliates, 
and the United States, as a just war. According to the first jus ad 
bellum principle, only legitimate sovereigns can engage in war 
with each other, and the basis for being considered a legitimate 
sovereign is the “common life” enumerated previously. Terrorist 
groups, despite having de facto power in the areas in which they 
operate, never have de jure power deriving from the consent of 
the people, and cannot properly be considered legitimate sover-
eigns because they do not foster a common life –  “absent com-
mon territory, groups are simply that: mere groups.”24 Because 
they lack this basic pre-requisite to sovereign rights, the rights of 
territorial sovereignty and political autonomy are not granted to 
them. When one legitimate sovereign attacks another, the ag-
gressor gives up its own rights partially or in total, while the vic-
tim is granted the right to revenge itself on the aggressor. This 
does not take place at all between groups and states, because 
there can be no trade off of rights. Although the terrorists can 
forfeit their own rights, they cannot be considered to constitute a 
state and thus acts against them are not acts of war.25 
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An instructive example would be the current situation in Af-
ghanistan. In 2001, the Bush administration launched a war 
against the semi-established government of Afghanistan led by 
the Taliban, but after toppling that regime, the “war” became 
merely an armed conflict in Afghanistan, with substantial 
fighting bleeding over into Pakistan as well as the Arabian pen-
insula, the Islamic Maghreb, and sub-Saharan Africa. Seemingly, 
the conflict would have to be characterized as either a non-
international or an internationalized non-international armed 
conflict. The conflict shares traits of both international and non-
international armed conflict, making it a good candidate for be-
ing considered an internationalized non-international armed con-
flict. However, this brings up multiple problems, for although 
the original Authorization for the Use of Force, granted by Con-
gress in 2001, legitimize force against al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and 
the Taliban, does it also legitimize acts of war in countries out-
side of its geographical purview? Or against splinter groups that 
are only tangentially related to al-Qaeda or the Taliban? If these 
cannot be considered acts of war, should they be considered as 
criminal justice proceedings? Until a concrete definition for this 
form of combat can be furnished, it remains in a non-legal limbo. 
 
 The Drone Dilemma and the Principle of  
Discrimination and Proportionality in Jus in bello 
 
 When the belligerents lack legitimacy, it calls into question 
whether the entire war itself may be considered just. If the entire 
war cannot be considered just according to jus ad bellum consid-
erations, it may still be possible to consider certain specific ac-
tions just if they accord with jus in bello principles, for it is cer-
tainly possible to wage a just war unjustly, and an unjust war 
justly.26 
 In regards to targeted killings, the administration’s spokes-
man Daniel Koh stated that “U.S. targeting practices, including 
lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial ve-
hicles, comply with all applicable law, including the laws of 
war.”27 Koh justified his position by referring to two principles 
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in just war theory, discrimination and proportionality.28 The 
principle of discrimination is defined by the Geneva Convention, 
which stipulates that signatory nations distinguish “between the 
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects 
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their opera-
tions only against military objectives.”29 This is justified by the 
rationale that the forces of an enemy nation are actively harming 
a victim nation, irrespective of their own conception of whether 
they are doing good or ill, and this justifies the right of the victim 
nation to target them. Conversely, civilians are not involved in 
any military activities and are committing no wrongs against the 
victim nation; ergo they cannot be targeted.30 This puts the onus 
of action on the perpetrator of violence, who must only engage 
with those directly involved in hostilities, defined as individuals 
who are:  
 
1. Being commanded by a person responsible for his subor-
dinates 
2. Having a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a dis-
tance 
3. Carrying arms openly 
4. Conducting operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war31 
 
 Although killing “high-level terrorists,” those involved in 
plotting, fomenting, and/or carrying out terrorists attacks, is the 
explicit goal of the targeted killing program, the failure of this 
idea may be observed in the number of collateral civilian casual-
ties from drone strikes. Estimates of civilian deaths from the 
American targeted killing program range from 4.95%32 to 33%, 
depending on the figures and the method of reckoning33  – the 
proper figure probably lies somewhere in the middle. The New 
America Foundation deduced from various news articles and 
reports that, of the 82 drone strikes conducted in Pakistan be-
tween 2006 and 2009, which resulted in between 750 and 1000 
casualties, 25-33% of casualties were civilian.34 Of the estimated 
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67-75% of casualties that were combatants, only 20 were consid-
ered “high-level targets” and thus worthy of special targeting – 
if you judge success based on the stated aims of the program, 
that leaves you with an adjusted ratio of 2-2.67% high-level ter-
rorists vis a vis civilians and low level militants. And this is to 
say nothing of the personal stories obscured by the data. For ex-
ample, the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, a cleric and 
propagandist for al-Qaeda working in the English language, on 
September 30, 2011 took place despite dubious evidence of his 
own militancy – he was targeted, rather, for his propaganda val-
ue, for which there is no legitimation in the just war tradition.35 
The death of his 16-year-old son Abdulrahman two weeks later 
is even more mordant – he was killed for the crime of looking for 
his father in the desert.36 It is perhaps notable that agents in the 
CIA, who are neither trained in the laws of war nor bound by 
them, eliminated both al-Awlakis in targeted killings, rather 
than the US military. The lack of accurate information on who is 
targeting militants, whether the CIA or the US military, makes 
further discussions of just war theory even more convoluted. 
 In targeting high-level terrorists, the US government is fail-
ing to respect the autonomy of the people it inadvertently kills in 
the process. Because the value of autonomy is based on the no-
tion that human beings have a dignity that puts them beyond 
any sort of valuation, infringing on the autonomy of these non-
combatants for the sake of some greater goal is inadmissible – it 
is patently absurd to discard the greater good of humanity for 
the lesser good of a putatively worthy military goal.37 It is cer-
tainly possible to target legitimate military targets while simulta-
neously respecting their autonomy, for if they act in violence to-
wards a legitimate power, it is the prerogative of that power to 
respond in kind to their action and neutralize the threat that they 
pose.38 However, it is not possible to legitimately target civilians, 
whether they are in the vicinity of combatants or for some puta-
tively greater goal.  
The failure of discrimination is not due to the drones alone. 
In defining combatants as uniformed, carrying arms, and com-
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manded by superior officers, just war theory circumscribes its 
own authority to archaic forms of warfare. In the current climate 
of fighting non-state actors, without uniforms or emblems, and 
who often embed themselves amongst a civilian population, dis-
crimination is difficult if not impossible to follow. Al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban are never consistently in accordance with any of the 
stipulations above, especially in the case of suicide attacks de-
pendent on the concealment of their combatant status, when ci-
vilian clothing is used as a “ruse and disguise.”39 When civilians 
and combatants frequently intermingle in the same space, as in 
much of modern warfare, fluidity between what defines a com-
batant and a civilian arises. The International Committee of the 
Red Cross attempted to resolve this issue by stating that civilians 
who engage in “spontaneous, sporadic, or unorganized”40 hostil-
ities are targetable only under such conditions, making them le-
gitimate targets intermittently. What constitutes the threshold 
between civilian and combatant is what the ICRC calls “direct 
participation,” which must be a “specific hostile act carried out 
as part of the conduct of hostilities between parties to an armed 
conflict,” and must be a simple causative relationship; indirect 
aid to the combatants, such as moral or propaganda support, 
cannot then be counted towards a civilian to combatant transi-
tion.41 
 However, when the inability to properly discriminate is con-
tingent on external factors, and these factors are exacerbated by 
technological deficiencies such as improving but still deficient 
technology, bad weather, pilot “mood,” overreliance on comput-
er algorithms, a lack of even basic training in the laws of war, 
and a lack of accurate intelligence to cross-reference, it is neces-
sary to reevaluate the methods in which we prosecute war.42 
Simply leaving the status quo unchanged is in itself a violation of 
autonomy, for it amounts to acknowledging that the current 
practices are sufficient for the prosecution of the war effort, in-
cluding the unacceptable civilian casualties. 
The inability to properly discriminate between combatant 
and civilian necessarily bleeds into the principle of proportional-
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ity, for it is impossible to calculate the threat to civilian lives 
when the transition from combatant to civilian, and civilian to 
combatant, is so nebulous.43 According to the Geneva Conven-
tion, the principle of proportionality proscribes “an attack which 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof.”44 
The basis for proportionality lies in the realization that, although 
the principle of discrimination already mandates that civilians 
remain unharmed, in the normal course of warfare this is an of-
ten-unrealizable goal. The principle of proportionality operates 
under the doctrine of double effect, which states that in certain 
instances, it may be permissible to bring about something that is 
foreseen but indirectly intended as a consequence of a strictly 
direct intention, if the foreseen effects are neither the end aimed 
at nor the means to the end.45 Michael Walzer adds further stipu-
lations, that the intended military action must be narrow, the 
intention of the moral actor must be good, and in acting he is 
“aware of the evil involved, seeks to minimize it, [and accepts] 
costs to himself.”46 All of these specific principles depend on the 
assumption that a moral actor is capable of making a “sharp dis-
tinction between legitimate targets and protected civilians” on 
the one hand, and that that moral actor is capable of identifying 
a “clear, uncontroversial threshold at which anticipated military 
advantage exceeds anticipated civilian damage”47 on the other.  
 It is important to note how this doctrine, which on its face 
contradicts the principle of autonomy, in fact complements it. 
First, we must accept a maxim to not harm civilians in the course 
of war – if the intention is to maintain the autonomy of these ci-
vilians, and their harm is not a means to the legitimate military 
goal, then we cannot be blamed morally for that harm as the in-
tentional maxim is upheld. This simultaneously enjoins us to 
take on a certain level of risk when we intentionally put civilians 
in harm’s way.48 If we do not accept this, we merely pay lip ser-
vice to the maxim of not harming combatants, for recognizing 
that this harm is wrong concurrently enjoins us to work to mini-
mize this harm – in the case of war, this becomes the sanction to 
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take on some risk ourselves.  
 By using drones, we are not obeying the injunction to equal-
ize risk between the civilians and ourselves. Drones are inherent-
ly dangerous to the idea of balanced risk: they are piloted re-
motely, often from thousands of miles away, by detached opera-
tors working in climate-controlled rooms, raining “death from 
the skies” at no personal risk to themselves, and then going 
home to eat dinner with their families while their victims lie 
smoldering, their families afraid to gather the remains for fear of 
being targeted themselves.49 The risk to US forces is minimal in 
this case, in fact nonexistent, creating an incentive to the use of 
force by removing the disincentive of human troops.50 It must be 
stated here that there is no presumption of an equalization of 
force, that because one side has superior firepower it should not 
be allowed to use it. Rather, the possession of this superior fire-
power entails greater reticence in its use, for we cannot simply 
unleash the full panoply of our forces without considering how 
it will affect the civilian population, and what responsibility that 
places on us. To not do so is to violate proportionality. 
Potentially, targeted killings are more humane in practice, 
because they do not involve a direct invasion of an area, which 
reduces the risk to both soldiers and civilians alike of becoming 
victims of violence.51 Not only is this contradicted by the statis-
tics for drone-related deaths, it is also contradicted by public pol-
icy polls conducted in places such as Pakistan. There has been an 
incipient blowback resulting from the large number of civilian 
casualties in Pakistan, as well as the increasingly large number of 
drone strikes, which has created a “siege mentality” amongst 
ordinary Pakistanis.52 In a Pew survey, “97% of respondents 
viewed [the drone program] negatively,”53 and this broad ill will 
translates into vociferous opposition on the ground – “every one 
of those dead civilians represents an alienated family, a new de-
sire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement that 
has grown exponentially even as drone strikes have increased.”54 
Not only do civilian casualties inflame the populace, militant 
groups have ramped up their attacks in response to the attacks. 
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The Pakistani Taliban attacked a police academy in Lahore, Paki-
stan in March of 2009, with their spokesman declaring that it 
was “in retaliation for the continued drone strikes by the US in 
collaboration with Pakistan on our people.”55 If drone strikes are 
exacerbating rather than helping the US war effort, this is an ob-
vious violation of proportionality.56 
Putting excessive faith into our technical capacities distorts 
the moral reasons for going to war, and as such should not be 
viewed with unguarded enthusiasm, but with suspicion. For as 
“silver bullet solutions” such as drones are increasingly domi-
nating the battlefield, their use is creating new objectives that 
then guide the course of the war – rather than the ends guiding 
the means, as is provided for in the principle of proportionality, 
the means are now guiding the ends. This is exemplified in a 
new doctrine of warfare in the US military called the “Overseas 
Contingency Operation,” (OCO), which necessitates targeting 
“potential threats to national security [that] have not yet been 
actualized,” hinging on the assumption that said threats will 
proliferate if they are not immediately contained.57 According to 
this new theory of warfare, not only can and should militants be 
targeted everywhere, but by doing so there are second, third, 
and n-level effects that can be accurately predicted to “ensure 
maximum success.”58 This undermines any sort of moral calcu-
lus, for if the myriad effects of a strike can be accurately calculat-
ed, any moral judgments we may have will increasingly become 
contingent on military considerations alone. The result is such a 
broad overlap between military and non-military targets that 
nearly anything can and will be defined as having a direct mili-
tary purpose, including civilians.59 
 
Conclusions 
 
 Throughout this paper, I have argued that drone strikes can-
not be justified in the current system of international humanitari-
an law, for the principles of just war theory are clearly and con-
sistently violated at every level of policy examined. In regards to 
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the jus ad bellum, although the Afghanistan War was based on the 
criterion of self-defense and thus just, the additional use of force 
against stateless groups and terrorists fails on the criterion of le-
gitimacy and is not just. This had the effect of rendering the en-
tire war, after the conclusion of its original purpose, unjust. 
However, it remained to be seen whether any of the actions 
within this unjust war could be considered just by examining the 
jus in bello principles of discrimination and proportionality. Both 
of these principles, invoked by the Obama administration as the 
just war sanction for its targeted killing program, were not up-
held, due to various factors either intrinsic to the targeted killing 
program itself, or tangential to it in terms of a loss of autonomy 
related to the program. 
In addition, the concept of autonomy was shown to be neces-
sary to understanding the moral import of just war theory. When 
autonomy is lost, the premises for just war theory are lost as 
well. War becomes a simple calculation, where the military end 
alone is important. If civilians are killed, it does not matter 
whether their deaths are proportional to a military goal, whether 
they have died for a just cause, whether they are a part of collat-
eral damage or were directly targeted. The inherent dignity and 
autonomy of the individual is seemingly at odds with the wan-
ton destruction of life in war, but it behooves us to reconcile the 
necessity of maintaining dignity and autonomy on the one hand, 
and the equal necessity of legislating war on the other. For it is 
surely better to have a war that minimizes the loss of life than 
one conducted solely according to human rapaciousness – as-
suming that the choice truly is a binary. I have explored, in some 
small way, what this means when applied on the ground. It is 
now necessary to determine how the law, or the practices gov-
erned by the law, ought to change in response. 
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